INTRODUCTION
T he political debate over the U.S. estate tax has become white hot in recent months, filled with moral indignation over compounding a family's grief over the loss of a loved one with a tax, of all things, and with the charge, made and later retracted by then Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, that those who oppose it are motivated solely by selfishness. Underneath this public ruckus, however, lie some fascinating and important economic issues. Our goal in this paper is to steer clear of the political debate and examine the estate tax by standard public finance criteria.
In the first section, we provide an overview of the estate and gift taxes. Noting that the taxes place burdens on transfers of wealth, in the second section we explore what is known about what motivates people to give gifts and bequests. The third section examines equity and incidence issues. The fourth section examines the efficiency of transfer taxes. The fifth section discusses administrative aspects of the tax. The sixth section discusses two key behavioral effects: the impact on saving and labor supply. The seventh section is a short conclusion. 1 1 We do not discuss the history of economic thought relating to estate taxes, but pertinent analyses date back to at least Adam Smith in the 18 th century. Smith argued that taxes at death were more administrable than taxes on gifts between living persons, because the former are harder to conceal. He also thought that estate taxes should be lighter or non-existent when the children of a decedent still live in the same house as the father, since the death would likely be associated with a "diminution of material well-being, and so a tax would be cruel and oppressive." (See Smith, 1976, p. 859.) Any estate left to children that are out of the parental house with children of their own, however, might be liable to some tax "without more inconveniency than what attends all duties of this kind." Smith argued that the tax was consistent with three of his maxims for taxation-certainty, convenience of payment, and economy in collection. It clearly violated his fourth maxim-equality. Smith also believed the tax reduced saving. David Ricardo (who was very rich) agreed, but John Stuart Mill and J.B. McCulloch did not. The debate largely focused on whether a tax liability due so far in the future, and attached to an event many people prefer not to think about, could really be a disincentive to activities undertaken in the prime of life. 2 See Joint Committee on Taxation (1998) for a summary of current law and legislative history of transfer taxes.
eral tax on wealth transfers dates to 1797 when, faced with the expenses of dealing with French attacks on American shipping, the Congress imposed a stamp duty on receipts for legacies and probates for wills. The tax was eliminated in 1802. An inheritance tax was instituted in 1862, during the Civil War, and was repealed in 1870. In 1894, Congress passed and the President signed into law an income tax that included all gifts and inheritances received as taxable income. The Supreme Court, however, declared the tax unconstitional. In 1898, to help finance the Spanish-American War, the federal government imposed its first estate tax, which was repealed in 1902.
The modern estate tax also originated in a time of war preparation, if not war itself, in 1916, but its survival after World War I is not surprising. Its introduction coincided with the movement of the late 19 th century and early 20 th century to replace federal customs and excise taxes, which were viewed by many as regressive, with more progressive taxes.
Since 1976 federal law has imposed a linked set of taxes on estates, gifts, and generation-skipping transfers.
3 By law, the executor of an estate must file a federal estate tax return within nine months of the death of a U.S. citizen or resident if the gross estate exceeds a threshold that is currently set at $675,000. 4 Generally, the gross estate includes all of the decedents' assets, life insurance proceeds from policies owned by the decedent, and gifts made by the decedent in excess of an annual exemption that is currently set at $10,000 per donee per year. 5 Total gross estate on estate tax returns filed in 1997 exceeded $162 billion. Taxable returns-i.e., returns that paid positive taxes-accounted for 48 percent of all returns and about 60 percent of total gross estate. Among taxable estates, personal residence and other real estate accounts for about 15 percent of gross estate, stocks (other than closely held), bonds and cash account for 66 percent, and small businesses (closely held stock, limited partnerships, and other non-corporate business assets) account for 10 percent. Farm assets account for 0.3 percent.
The composition of taxable estates varies significantly by estate size. Among taxable estates with gross assets below $1.0 million, small business assets account for only about 2 percent of gross estate, cash accounts for 23 percent, and stocks for 23 percent. Among taxable estates with gross assets above $20 million, small business assets account for 23 percent, stocks account for 45 percent, and cash accounts for just 3.2 percent of gross estate.
The estate tax provides unlimited deductions for transfers to a surviving spouse and contributions to charitable organizations. Deductions are also allowed for debts owed by the estate, funeral expenses, and administrative and legal fees associated with the estate. In addition, closely-held family businesses are allowed an extra deduction of up to 3 The laws that govern how and to whom property may pass are the exclusive domain of the states. Most states provide a surviving spouse and minor children with some protection against disinheritance. In cases of intestacy, state laws provide a structure to guide succession. In contrast, federal law governs the taxation of such transfers, although states may also impose estate, inheritance, or gift taxes. 4 This threshold is scheduled to rise, along with the "effective exemption" described below, to $1 million by 2006. 5 Typically, assets are set at fair market value. Closely-held businesses, however, are allowed to value assets at their "use value" rather than their highest alternative market-oriented value. This can provide a reduction in value of up to $750,000. In addition, it is often possible to discount the valuation of assets by placing them in a mediated ownership form, such as a family limited partnership, rather than holding them on own account (see Schmalbeck, forthcoming) . The estate is usually valued as of the date of death, but alternatively may be valued at a date up to six months after the death, if the asset values decline during this period.
$625,000 for the value of the business being transferred.
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Among all returns filed in 1997, deductions accounted for about 45 percent of gross estate, but this ratio rises dramatically with estate size, from 26 percent for estates with gross assets below $1 million to 70 percent for estates above $20 million. Bequests to surviving spouses are substantial across all estate sizes. In contrast, charitable contributions total only 11 percent of deductions for estates below $1 million, but rise to 40 percent of deductions for estates above $20 million. The 182 taxable estates with gross estate over $20 million that made charitable contributions contributed an average of $41 million.
After determining net estate-gross estate less deductions-the statutory tax rate is applied. Statutory marginal tax rates are given in Table 1 . Formally, the statutory tax schedule applies an 18 percent rate to the first $10,000 of lifetime transfers, with the rate rising to 37 percent on transfers above $675,000, and rising in several stages to 55 percent on taxable transfers above $3 million. However, effective tax rates differ from the statutory schedule for several reasons. First, although the lowest formal tax rate is 18 percent, the lowest rate that any taxable return faces is 37 percent due to the federal unified estate and gift tax credit. This credit is currently set at $220,550, which provides an effective exemption of the first $675,000 of transfers given during life and at death, above and beyond the $10,000 per person per year gift exemption and the other exclusions noted above. The unified credit is scheduled to rise in stages to $345,800 by 2006, raising the effective exemption to $1 million per person.
Second, an additional credit is allowed for gift taxes previously paid, and for estate tax previously paid on inherited wealth. The latter is phased out over ten years, in two year intervals, from the date the wealth was inherited. The credit for estate taxes previously paid on inherited wealth is intended to reduce the extent of (double) taxation of recently inherited wealth. Third, another tax credit is given for state inheritance and estate taxes (but not for state gift taxes). The credit rate is based on the "adjusted taxable estate," which is the federal taxable estate less $60,000, and the allowable credit ranges from zero to 16 percent of the base. Thus, the credit for state taxes can reduce the maximum effective federal statutory tax rate to 39 percent for the largest estates. Most states now levy so-called "soak-up" taxes that fall within the credit limit, so that they transfer revenue from the federal to the state treasuries without adding to the total tax burden on the estate. Finally, a 5 percentage point surtax is added on transfers between $10 million and about $17,180,000. 7 This surcharge 18  20  22  24  26  28  30  32  34  37  39  41  43  45  49  53  55   TABLE 1  FEDERAL UNIFIED ESTATE AND GIFT TAX  RATES, 2000 Taxable Estate and Gifts ($ thousands)
Source: IRS (1999) raises the effective marginal estate tax rate to 60 percent and claws back the benefit of the graduated rate structure.
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Although the federal estate and gift taxes are unified in many respects, an important distinction is that estates are taxed on a tax-inclusive basis, whereas gifts are taxed on a tax-exclusive basis.
9
In addition to estate and gift taxes, federal law imposes a separate tax on generation-skipping transfers (e.g., from grandparents to grandchildren) that exceed $1 million per donor. This tax, which raises little revenue itself, is designed mainly to shut down what would otherwise be a straightforward way to avoid transfer taxes (see Schmalbeck, forthcoming) .
MOTIVES FOR INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS
The impact of transfer taxes on efficiency, equity, and economic behavior depends crucially on why people give bequests (see Kaplow, forthcoming; and Gale and Perozek, forthcoming) . Previous research has considered several classes of models of intergenerational transfers, but has had difficulty reaching a consensus about the relative importance of each.
In the accidental bequest model, people face uncertain life spans and accumulate assets to save for retirement. They do not plan or desire to give bequests, but they do not annuitize their wealth either, as would occur in a simple life-cycle model, because of imperfect or missing annuity markets or because they are also saving for precautionary reasons against, say, uncertain future health expenses. Under these assumptions, people will generally have positive asset holdings when they die, even though they do not have a bequest motive.
Accidental bequests can account for a large fraction of aggregate wealth (Abel, 1985) and can help to explain puzzling wealth accumulation patterns of the elderly (Davies, 1981; Hurd, 1987) . Substantial evidence from patterns of inter vivos giving, life insurance, and annuity choices, however, indicates that some portion of transfers are intended (Bernheim, 1991; Gale and Scholz, 1994; Kotlikoff, 1989; Laitner and Juster, 1996; McGarry, 1997; Page, 1997) . The existence of estate planning and tax avoidance techniques further suggests that not all bequests are accidental.
In the pure altruism model (Barro, 1974; Becker, 1974) , parents care about their own consumption and the utility of their children. Parents make transfers and leave bequests until the marginal cost in terms of their own foregone consumption is equal to the marginal benefit to the parents of the increase in their children's consumption. Bequests are given differentially across children to compensate for differences in endowments or outcomes. Variations of altruism with and without a mechanism that allows a parent to commit to a given transfer level are examined in Waldman (1990, 1991) , Lindbeck and Weibull (1988), and Perozek (1996) . 8 By law, payment is due within nine months of the decedent's death, although a six month extension may be obtained. However, the actual timing of the tax payment is flexible. In the presence of a well-functioning market for life insurance, a one-time estate tax liability at an uncertain future date can be transformed into a series of annual premium payments. In addition, the tax law itself provides for ex post spreading out of tax payments over 14 years for closely-held family businesses. 9 For example, suppose the applicable estate and gift tax rate is 50 percent and consider the implications of giving a gift or a bequest that costs the donor $15,000 including taxes. If the funds are given as an inter vivos transfer, the recipient would receive $10,000 and the donor would pay gift tax of $5,000 (50 percent of $10,000). If the funds are given as a bequest, the recipient would receive only $7,500, and the estate would owe $7,500 in taxes (50 percent of $15,000). Tomes (1981 Tomes ( , 1988 and Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) provide support for the altruistic model. Other research, however, has rejected three sharp empirical implications of altruism. First, Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1992) show that the division of consumption within the family is not independent of the division of income, contrary to the predictions of an altruism model with operative transfers. Second, several studies find that, among families where parents make transfers to children, a one-dollar increase in parents' resources coupled with a one-dollar reduction in children's resources does not raise transfers by a dollar, although it should under altruism (Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff, 1992; Cox, 1987; and McGarry and Schoeni, 1995) . 10 Third, under altruism, siblings with lower incomes should receive larger inheritances than siblings with higher incomes, but empirically they typically do not Menchik, 1980 Menchik, , 1988 and Wilhelm, 1996) . The last rejection is striking because equal division of estates among children appears to be the norm. Bernheim and Severinov (1998) offer an explanation of this norm by showing how it can arise in a model with parental altruism combined with the assumption that a child derives utility from his perception of parental affection towards him relative to other siblings.
A variety of "exchange" models posit that bequests or transfers are the payment for some good or service provided by children. In the strategic bequest model (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers, 1985) , parents care about their own consumption, their children's utility, and services obtained from children. These services may represent standard market goods or services (lawn mowing, for example) or more personal items, such as visits, attention, or children's choices regarding marriage, childbearing, education, career, and location of residence. Parents pay for services with bequests, rather than inter vivos transfers. By delaying payment, parents can control children's actions for a longer period, and extract the entire consumer surplus out of the exchange relationship. In Cox (1987) , parents buy services from their children via inter vivos gifts, and the exchange may be mutually beneficial. Empirical tests of exchange models have generated mixed results (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 1985; Cox, 1987; and Perozek, 1998) .
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Other specifications simply assume that households acquire utility directly from wealth or from the after-tax bequest they leave. This specification is sometimes offered as a structural model. Aaron and Munnell (1992) , Bakshi and Chen (1996) , and Carroll (2000) , for example, argue that (pre-estate-tax) wealth may enter the utility function as a separate argument, above and beyond the conventional consumption goods it can finance, because wealth may also provide social status, power, social connections, etc. A related case occurs if households care directly about the size of the after-tax bequest they provide (Blinder, 1976; Carroll, 2000) . Alternatively, the specifications using pre-or post-tax wealth may be thought of as reduced forms consistent with different structural motivations for transfers. Carroll (2000) presents casual evidence 10 Although, see McGarry (2000) , who considers a dynamic model of altruism and concludes that this test is mis-specified. 11 The equal division puzzle is a problem for the strategic bequest motive, although Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) offer a possible reconciliation. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) offer an alternative exchange model, where parents face uncertain lifetimes and imperfect annuity markets. To insure against outliving their resources, parents essentially buy annuities from their children and pay for the annuities with bequests. The model suffers from the empirical problem that large, ongoing flows of wealth from children to living parents are rarely observed (Gale and Scholz, 1994) , but that may be due to the sizable annuities that the government already provides in the form of Medicare and Social Security.
consistent with the utility-of-wealth model, but no formal tests of either model exist. Each motive above is plausible and draws support from at least some research, but each motive that has been tested has also been rejected. This suggests that households may be influenced by several motives, or that the importance of each may vary across households. Differences in empirical outcomes may also be due in part to data limitations and the difficulty of distinguishing rejection of the underlying behavioral model from rejection of the maintained assumptions needed to generate testable hypotheses.
It is worth emphasizing that analysis of the estate tax requires evidence on the motives of the very wealthiest households. However, there is even less known about the very wealthy than about the moderately wealthy or middle-class households that are the mainstay of most empirical work on transfers, and the richest households may well have different motives for, and patterns of, wealth accumulation. Recent work has only begun to examine the behavior of the very wealthy in detail. See, for example, the papers in Slemrod (2000) .
EQUITY ISSUES
This section explores issues relating to the vertical and horizontal equity of the estate tax. The first and second sections examine the partial equilibrium incidence of the tax. The third section discusses general equilibrium incidence issues. These sections generally conclude that the tax is progressive. The fourth section examines other issues relating to progressivity, while the fifth section discusses horizontal equity.
Assigning the Burden to Donors
The economic incidence of the tax depends on the base, the rate structure, the enforcement regime, and households' responses to the tax. These responses, in turn, will depend on the motivation for transfers, as discussed above. We examine incidence first by assuming the burden is borne by donors, and then by assuming it is borne by recipients. In a partial equilibrium setting, the tax will be borne only by donors if variations in estate tax rules cause donors to adjust their gross estate (and hence their consumption or labor supply) in a way that keeps constant the net-of-tax inheritance received.
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The tax will be borne by recipients if variations in the tax cause donors to keep the gross (pre-tax) bequest constant.
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Examining the incidence of a tax requires addressing the prior question of how to classify people or families in order to construct a "distributional table." For the estate tax, a natural ordering unit is estate size. Other taxes, however, are typically distributed-by Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Treasury, Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT), and others-by annual income. We pursue both approaches below, though neither approach is without problems.
14 Table 2 provides information on the distribution of returns, gross estates, and tax payments by estate size in 1997. Estate tax 12 Note that this implies that increases in the estate tax would raise donors' saving, unless all of the revenue is recycled to the donor. 13 Of course, if the donors are altruistic, the reduced (after-tax) bequest will also reduce the utility of the donors. 14 Ideally, data would match estate tax returns to lifetime income measures. No such income measure currently exists, although Joulfaian (forthcoming) uses a data set that matches decedents' estate tax returns with the previous 10 years' worth of income tax returns. uses data from a Treasury collation study that links estate tax returns to the income tax return in the last full year the decedent was alive. Income in the last year, however, when people are typically elderly and retired, and often are ill, is probably not be a very meaningful indication of affluence.
liability is extraordinarily concentrated among high-wealth decedents. In 1997, estates with gross values over $5 million accounted for over 43 percent of gross estate and over half of all transfer tax revenues, but only 5.5 percent of all taxable estates (and about 1 out of every 1,000 deaths, not shown). In contrast, the 85 percent of taxable estates with assets below $2.5 million account for only about 42 percent of gross estate and just 30 percent of transfer tax revenues. Table 3 provides information on tax burdens by estate size. The average taxable return has gross estate worth over $2.2 million and pays federal estate taxes of about $388,000 and pays total transfer taxes, including gift taxes and state taxes, of about $506,000. This corresponds to an average estate tax rate of 17 percent and an average overall rate of 22 percent. These rates generally rise with estate size. For taxable returns with gross estates below $1 million, the average transfer tax rate is just 8 percent. This figure rises to above 30 percent for taxable estates with gross assets between $2.5 million and $20 million, and then falls to 21 percent for taxable estates with gross assets above $20 million. The decline in the average overall transfer tax rate among estates above $20 million is due to a sharp increase in deductions for this group relative to others.
The Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) of the Department of the Treasury has undertaken distributional analysis based on annual income and assuming that estate and gift taxes are borne by decedents. Expected estate tax payments for each family are calculated by (a) imputing family wealth, (b) calculating estate tax liabilities as a function of wealth and marital status, and (c) applying a mortality probability based on age. 15 The resulting distribution of estate taxes is shown in Table  4 , along with Treasury estimates of individual income tax burdens. The table shows that, when the burden is assigned to the donor, estate tax burdens are highly skewed toward high-income individuals. More than 99 percent of the burden falls on the top quintile, 96 percent on the top decile, 91 percent on the top 5 percent and 64 percent on the top 1 percent of the income distribution. The estate tax is clearly more progressive than the income tax, under the OTA assumptions. For the most affluent 1 percent of families its burden is more than 6 percent of the burden of the individual income tax. To the extent that income in the last year of life understates true lifetime income, the Treasury methodology will understate the true progressivity of estate taxes. 16 Feenberg, Mitrusi, and Poterba (FMP, 1997) provide an alternative estimate, based on public-use income tax return files supplemented by CPS data on nonfilers. They allocate the burden of estate and gift taxes to units with someone over the age of 65 in proportion to each unit's share of capital income in excess of $30,000.
17 Thus, they assume that the tax is borne by decedents and provide no special adjustments for a surviving spouse. Table 5 shows the resulting distribution of imputed estate and income tax liability by income class for 1991. Because taxpayers with annual income over $200,000 comprise about 1 percent of the total population, it is straightforward to compare their results with OTA's. FMP calculate that the estate tax burden on this group totals $6.4 billion or 58 percent of total estate taxes, just slightly below the 64 percent estimate provided by OTA. According to FMP, for this group the $6.4 billion estate tax burden is 5.1 percent of the burden imposed by the personal in- come tax, which is also somewhat less than the 6.4 percent of the Treasury analysis.
B. Assigning the Burden to Recipients
While assigning the burden to recipients of inheritances (or those who would have been recipients if taxes had been lower) may seem to be a polar alternative to the assumption that donors bear the burden, in practice the implications for progressivity do not appear to be dissimilar, because the recipients of estates tend to have very high income and wealth themselves. reports that, among children receiving inheritances from taxable estates in 1982, average adjusted gross income (AGI) was $47,433. For decedents with estates over $10 million, average children's AGI was $271,000. For decedents with estates between $2.5 million and $10 million, average children's AGI was $123,000. These results suggest that recipients are quite well off. By comparison, median family income was $23,433 in 1982, and average money income in the top 5 percent of the distribution was $82,684. Thus, while there may be significant controversy over whether donors or recipients bear the burden of estate taxes, for purposes of understanding the progressivity of the tax with respect to current income (and, we conjecture, lifetime income), the controversy does not matter very much. Both donors and recipients are quite well off.
General Equilibrium Considerations
None of the estimates discussed above allow for general equilibrium effects. These will in turn depend on how people who give and receive bequests adjust their labor supply and saving, a topic addressed in more detail in the sixth section. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that if the tax reduces personal saving and that reduces (domestic) capital accumulation, the resulting long-term reduction in wages will offset to some degree the extreme progressivity of its statutory burden distribution. Along these lines, Stiglitz (1978) shows that, if the estate tax reduces saving, it can have perverse effects on the distribution of income. Specifically, the reduction in saving reduces the capital stock, which raises the return on capital and reduces wages. In the long run, an increase in the estate tax could raise the share of income accruing to capital. Laitner (forthcoming) develops an intergenerational simulation model and shows that removing the estate tax in his framework would raise saving, as Stiglitz assumes. Laitner also finds that removing the estate tax would significantly increase the concentration of wealth.
Progressivity: Further Discussion
Progressivity has long been a principal justification for the estate tax (see Graetz, 1983 , for example). The large increase in the concentration of before-tax income and wealth over the last two decades arguably makes the case for progressivity even more compelling (see Slemrod and Bakija, 1999 ). Our analysis above suggests that transfer taxes in the U.S. are progressive, but raises some additional issues.
First, one might reasonably ask why the desired degree of progressivity couldn't be achieved solely through the income tax. The answer usually given is that the capacity of the income tax to impose progressive burdens is limited by several factors, notably the preferential treatment of capital gains. Capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than other capital income; they are taxed only when the underlying assets are sold as opposed to when the gains accrue. Most important, gains are excused from income taxation at death. Unrealized gains are very heavily concentrated in the largest estates. For example, Poterba and Weisbrenner (forthcoming) estimate that in 1998 more than half of all estates with assets above $10 million had over half of their wealth in the form of unrealized gains. For all estates above $250,000, less than one-third of the wealth consisted of unrealized capital gains. Thus, the role of the estate tax as a "backstop" to the income tax is closely related to the progressivity of the estate tax.
Second, it is often claimed by both supporters and opponents of the tax that the estate tax has failed to reduce the concentration of wealth, which seems at first glance to contradict the claim that the tax is progressive. It is true that the concentration of wealth is not obviously lower in the era of high estate taxes than it was before. But the real question is whether the concentration of wealth is less than it would be in the absence of the tax. In addition, it is probably unrealistic to expect that a tax that in a typical year raises revenue equal to just 0.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and just 0.1 percent of household net worth would make a serious dent in overall wealth inequality. Thus, even if the estate tax has not had a huge impact on the measured concentration of wealth, it can still be highly progressive.
A related argument is that policy should be concerned not with the concentration of wealth as much as with the concentration of consumption or well-being. If the estate tax encourages people to spend their money while they are alive, it exacerbates inequality in living standards (McCaffery, 1994) .
Horizontal Equity
While progressivity issues focus on the treatment of those with higher income or wealth relative to those with less, horizontal equity focuses on how "equals"-different households with the same income or wealth-are treated relative to each other. The estate tax raises many difficult issues along these lines.
For example, opponents claim that the estate tax inequitably burdens families that are altruistic relative to those who are selfish, and punishes those who are unwilling or unable to engage in sophisticated tax planning to avoid the tax. To be sure, the estate tax is a tax on one way to dispose of one's wealth, passing it along in financial form to one's chosen heirs. Comparing two families of the same (considerable) means, this tax will not burden the one that chooses to spend every penny on themselves, or even the family that gives it away to charity, but burdens only those families that pass their good fortune along to their own. Edward McCaffery (1994) stresses this "horizontal" inequity of the estate tax. Clearly, from the perspective of the decedent, it does seem to violate principles of equity to single out families that are generous to their own children.
The perspective, however, is crucial to this argument. From the perspective of the next generation, inheritance provides an advantage to some rather than others. Supporters of the tax claim that advantages so derived are unearned and unfair. They claim that inheritances provide large benefits to people who may not have demonstrated any other "skill" than that of choosing affluent parents. They argue that this seriously distorts notions of equality of opportunity, and is detrimental to widely shared notions of fair play. In response, opponents of the tax would argue that these notions of fairness need not be universally shared, and in any case, differences in inheritance contribute only a small amount to overall differences in wealth inequality.
A second line of debate concerns parental versus societal rights regarding the institution of inheritance. Opponents of the tax argue that parents should have unlimited rights to pass along wealth to their children. They note that other forms of transfers-investing in human capital, providing social contacts and networks, bringing kids into a family business, giving gifts of up to $10,000 per year, etc.-are tax-free and question why transfers at death should be treated differently. Supporters of the estate tax agree that large transfers can already be made tax-free and conclude that the ability to provide adequately-indeed, generously-for one's offspring is not hampered by transfer taxes. But they see a need to level the playing field-or at least to limit the tiltamong the recipients of inheritances, for reasons of equity. Stelzer (1997) also notes that putting limits on the use of personal property is a natural, continuing, and appropriate role for society to play. Others have argued that inheritance is a civic right, not a natural right, so government has not only the discretion but the duty to regulate such activity.
A third set of horizontal equity issues relates to the treatment of married versus single taxpayers. Bequests to surviving spouses are not only deductible from taxable estate, they also enjoy the benefits of "basis step-up" for assets with capital gains. This provides an added benefit to a married couple with a given amount of wealth relative to two single people with the same amount of wealth as the married couple. This marriage bonus has to our knowledge never been measured, but could potentially run in the millions of dollars for some wealthy families.
These fairness issues hinge to a significant extent on value judgments, fairness being always and everywhere "in the eye of the beholder." As a result, it is quite difficult to resolve these issues analytically, and even more difficult to do so in a political arena.
EFFICIENCY ISSUES
A tax has an efficiency cost to the extent that it causes people and firms to make choices different than what they would have made in the absence of taxes, income effects and externalities aside. From this perspective a uniform tax on (or at) death is a highly efficient lump-sum tax, given the inevitability of death. 18 The estate and gift tax, however, is not a tax on death per se, but on wealth transferred (other than to spouses or charities) during life and at death, so the relevant be- 18 The timing of death may be somewhat sensitive to financial considerations. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2000b) investigate the timing of deaths around major changes in the estate tax and find some evidence that the date of (reported) death is prolonged into the period after a tax reduction. They also report data suggesting that the timing of death may be sensitive to major personal or societal events.
havioral responses concern the accumulation of wealth, to whom that wealth is transferred, and what avoidance measures are taken to reduce the tax burden.
Pure Efficiency Considerations
Does an estate tax create greater or lesser distortions per dollar of revenue raised than other taxes? 19 Optimal tax theory indicates that, on pure efficiency grounds, taxes should distinguish among the different uses of labor income only to the extent that the uses are more or less complementary to leisure, which is untaxed. Taxing complements of leisure at a higher rate than other goods reduces the inefficiency created by the inability to tax leisure. The income tax distorts the lifetime leisure-consumption choice, whereas the estate tax distorts the lifetime consumption-inheritance choice. Kaplow (forthcoming) argues that in the absence of any evidence about the relative complementarity of lifetime consumption versus inheritances with respect to leisure, there is no place for an estate tax in an optimal tax structure that is based solely on efficiency considerations. This simple, but powerful, conclusion, however, may be affected by at least three considerations: the trade-off between equity and efficiency, the motivation for transfers, and avoidance technology for estate taxes. We consider the first two in this section, and the third in the following section.
Trade-offs Between Equity and Efficiency
Optimal tax analysis may incorporate considerations of equity as well as efficiency, and the trade-off between the two. As discussed above, the burden of the estate tax appears to be extraordinarily progressive. Thus, a model of optimal taxation that trades off the net benefits of different taxes on both efficiency and equity grounds would show that the estate tax can be part of an optimal tax system even if its marginal efficiency cost exceeds that of other, less progressive, taxes. 20 In its simplest form, the marginal efficiency cost is the ratio of the marginal revenue collected in the absence of behavioral responses to the marginal revenue collected in the presence of whatever behavioral responses occur. Note, though, that the efficiency cost of the estate tax should certainly not be ignored. For example, if the estate tax distorted behavior but raised no revenue (as alleged by Bernheim (1987) and Feldstein (2000) ), the marginal efficiency cost would be infinite and the estate tax would certainly not be part of an optimal tax system.
The Role of Transfer Motives
In assessing the efficiency costs of taxing, for example, gasoline, we would inquire into how the tax affected demand for gasoline and other goods, including leisure. We would not ordinarily need to dwell on why anyone buys gasoline, except to the extent that doing so provided insights into the relevant elasticities of demand. Why people leave bequests, though, affects the efficiency costs of the estate tax, because it affects the behavioral response to the tax (see Gale and Perozek, forthcoming) and the presence of externalities in giving (Kaplow, forthcoming) .
The simplest "motive" for transfers is none at all. Consider the special case of no bequest motive coupled with an imperfect market for annuities. In this case, there are "unintended" bequests. An estate tax would have no substitution effect on the donor 's behavior (because it changes the relative price of something the individual places no value on). Nor does it have any income effect, for the same reason. Thus, the donor's consumption and wealth at any time are unaffected. The absence of substitution effects implies that the tax revenue is collected without producing any excess burden, as would be true under a lump-sum tax. But, unlike a lump-sum tax, the estate tax in this case also does not make the donor worse off. This makes such a tax look "super-efficient," as it produces revenue for the government without hurting the donor. Of course the potential inheritors will be worse off because of the tax take, as discussed below.
Although some bequests are undoubtedly "unintentional," others are undoubtedly motived by altruism, whereby the donor places a value on the inheritors' well-being. Kaplow (forthcoming) argues that altruism creates a positive externality for gifts and bequests, because the transfers have value to both the donorwhich the donor considers in determining the size of the bequest-and to the recipient. As with any positive externality, ceteris paribus gifts and bequests will be underprovided, leading to an argument for a subsidy, rather than a tax.
This model, however, has a surprising implication. It implies that in some circumstances a social planner would favor a policy that reduces the consumption of all generations, if more of the consumption is financed by inheritances! The positive externality of the transfer process offsets the fact that everyone in the extended family actually has less resources to spend on the things they value (other than giving to others). This result is due to the joy of giving model. In a pure altruism model, the result would not arise because ancestors care about the utility of their descendants but not about giving per se.
A related model combines parental altruism and opportunistic behavior on the part of children. This gives rise to a "Samaritan's Dilemma:" if the parent is altruistic toward the child, and the child knows that, the child has incentives to behave in ways that are counter to the parent's overall interest. For example, the child would have incentives to overconsume when young in order to elicit a larger bequest from the parent. In this case, it is possible that the estate tax has some welfare-improving properties. By making it more difficult for the parent to transfer resources to the child, the tax helps offset the distortion created by the Samaritan's Dilemma in the first place (see Gale and Perozek, forthcoming) .
Finally, bequests may be payment for services provided by potential inheritors, and these inheritors may be strategically played off against each other by the donor. In this case, bequests are simply payment for goods and services purchased from the child, and the estate tax is similar in nature to the gasoline tax mentioned above. A relevant consideration is the elasticity of parents' demand for such services. If the elasticity of demand is very lowwhich could occur if there are not good substitutes for a child's love and attention-then the optimal estate tax rate would be higher than otherwise. But the full efficiency implications in this context have not been worked out.
Thus, the efficiency implications of estate taxes are unclear and will depend on motives for transfers, which likely vary across givers and types of gifts. 21 One potential way out of these problems, suggested by Kaplow (forthcoming) is to work toward identifying particular types of gifts (for example, to children, to charity, to unrelated individuals) that appear likely to be motivated by a particular con-sideration (for example, altruism, joy of giving, exchange) and then apply the efficient tax, given the transfer motive.
Administrative Issues
Simplicity, avoidance, and evasion are central features of the analysis of estate taxes. On the one hand, death is very likely to provide a convenient "tax handle." The public nature of the probate process reveals information about assets that may be difficult to obtain in the course of the enforcement of other taxes, but that nevertheless may be relevant for societal notions of the appropriate level of progressivity. This administrative aspect of taxation of death likely explains why inheritance and estate taxes date back for centuries.
On the other hand, critics argue that one of the tax's main effects is to spawn a host of avoidance schemes that are socially wasteful and erode the potential revenue yield. In that vein, Cooper (1979) labeled the estate tax a "voluntary" tax. Bernheim (1987) argued that the revenue yield, net of the avoidance schemes it induced, was approximately zero. Although many of the avoidance schemes that Cooper and Bernheim discussed have been closed off or otherwise mitigated by subsequent legislation, others (bordering, frankly, on the abusive) remain (see Schmalbeck, forthcoming) . In this section, we examine the costs of complying with and administering the tax, and the extent and implications of transfer tax avoidance and evasion.
Compliance and Administrative Costs
The cost of collecting the estate tax has two components. Compliance costs are borne directly by taxpayers as time or money spent on tax advice and implementation of tax planning devices, and by claimants to the estate in complying with the estate tax itself. Administrative costs are borne directly by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in operating, monitoring, and enforcing the system.
Estimates of the compliance cost of the estate tax vary enormously, partly because the methodologies used range from backof-the-envelope estimates to methodologically suspect surveys to more or less informed speculation. Munnell (1988) is widely cited as the source of the claim that "the costs of complying with the estate tax laws are roughly the same magnitude as the revenue raised" (Joint Economic Committee, 1998). What Munnell actually wrote was that the compliance costs "may well approach the revenue yield." Her methodology consists of noting that (in 1988 or thereabouts) there were 12,000 subscriptions to the practitioner publication Trusts and Estates, noting that a large fraction of trusts are apparently established solely to avoid taxes, and making the following calculation. The American Bar Association at the time reported that 16,000 lawyers cited trust, probate, and estate law as their area of concentration. Valuing their time at $150,000 per year on average and assuming that they spend half of their time on estate tax avoidance yields $1.2 billion, compared to revenues of $7.7 billion in 1987. To get from $1.2 billion to close to $7.7 billion, Munnell refers to "accountants eager to gain an increasing share of the estate planning market," financial planners and insurance agents who devote a considerable amount of their energies to minimizing estate taxes, and the efforts of the individuals themselves. Munnell concludes that the avoidance costs "must amount to billions of dollars annually," but the $1.2 billion component is based on some not unreasonable but highly arbitrary assumptions, and the rest of the overall compliance cost estimate is a hunch and no more. It is also worth noting that the estimate is 13 years out of date, and during that period estate tax revenues have risen dramatically. Thus, even if compliance costs at that point were almost equal to revenues, there is no guarantee that they have increased at the same rate that revenues have. Davenport and Soled (1999) adopt a different but related approach. Based on consultations with tax professionals about average charges for typical estate tax planning, they come up with an estimated fee per estate for six different estate size classes, and then apply these estimates to the number of estate tax returns by category in 1996. This procedure produces an estimated compliance cost for planning of $290 million, or only about 2 percent of the $14.5 billion collected in 1996. After a series of fairly ad hoc adjustments for such factors as the number of nontaxable decedents that do tax planning and that tax planning may have to be repeated as the tax law changes, they come up with a figure of $1.047 billion for planning costs in 1999. To this they add $628 million for estate administration costs, based on taking one-half of the total lawyers' fees and other costs reported on estate tax returns, and reducing that number by 45 percent to reflect the tax deductibility of the costs. (Note that the last reduction is inappropriate if one is measuring the social, rather than private, costs of the activity.) The sum of their estimates for planning and estate administration come to $1.675 billion in 1999, or about 6.4 percent of expected receipts. They allocate another 0.6 percent of revenues for the administrative costs of running the activities of the IRS relating to estate taxes, for a total cost of collection estimate equal to 7.0 percent of revenues.
The Davenport-Soled (DS) estimate is more recent and more detailed than Munnell's estimate. Although both estimates require a set of somewhat arbitrary assumptions, it is difficult to see how the basic DS methodology could be re-done with an alternative set of reasonable assumptions and yield anything close to Munnell's figure.
The estimates above-based on suppliers of estate tax avoidance techniquesproduce a huge range of collection costs. Another approach would be to survey the demanders of the service, the wealth owners. This approach has been employed with some success for the U.S. individual income tax (Slemrod and Sorum, 1984; and Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1992) , and for the U.S. corporation income tax (Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1996) . As a point of comparison, based on such studies, concludes that the collection cost of the U.S. individual and corporate income tax comes to about 10 percent of the revenue collected.
Unfortunately, no reliable and comprehensive survey research has been carried out for the estate tax. What does exist applies only to businesses and may be considered suspect. Astrachan and Aronoff (1995) surveyed businesses in the distribution, sale, and service of construction, mining, and forestry equipment industry, and separately surveyed businesses owned by African-Americans. Each of these are very special and small subsamples of the estate tax population, and the methodology employed, is worrisome on a number of dimensions. For example, the authors include as a cost of avoidance the amount spent on insurance premiums to provide liquidity for paying the estate tax. This expense is properly thought of as pre-paying the tax liability, and to consider it as a cost in addition to the tax liability itself is surely inappropriate double counting.
Based on a survey of 983 of all types of family businesses, but still restricted to family businesses, Astrachan and Tutterow (1996) conclude that family business owners have average expenditures of over $33,000 on accountants, attorneys, and financial planners working on estate planning issues; family members aver-aged about 167 hours spent on estate planning issues over the previous six years (the time frame for the dollar expenditures is not made clear). However, this survey includes as a compliance cost the prepayment of estate tax liabilities via life insurance, which is problematic for reasons noted above. In addition, an unknown fraction of the remaining costs is due to estate planning, inter alia about intergenerational succession of the business, that is unrelated to taxation. Repetti (2000) , while corroborating in surveys of estate tax attorneys the broad magnitude of the Astrachan and Tutterow results, argues that in fact part or much of these costs would likely be incurred regardless of whether there was an estate tax.
Thus, there is some evidence on the costs of estate planning for small businesses, but the estimates are marked by conceptual problems and disagreement about what fraction of costs due to the estate and gift tax as opposed to non-tax factors or other taxes. For the broader population, there is no informative evidence from surveys of wealth owners.
Extent of Avoidance and Evasion
Estimating the extent of (legal) avoidance and (illegal) evasion is difficult. Wolff (1994) and Poterba (2000) attempt to do so by comparing tax revenues and the distribution of estates reported on tax forms and similar statistics calculated from a procedure that estimates these items using data on individuals' mortality probability and wealth measured in the Survey of Consumer Finances. Because of a number of methodological differences, they reach vastly different conclusions, with Wolff finding that the estate tax catches only about 25 percent of the potential tax base, and Poterba concluding that it catches nearly all of it. Eller, Erard, and Ho (2000) point out that any such exercise is highly sensitive to a few essentially arbitrary assumptions about the allocation of deductions and credits, the differential mortality of married and unmarried individuals, and the treatment of the first spouse in a couple to die.
For obvious reasons, coming up with a direct estimate of the extent of evasion is problematic, to say the least-surveys are unlikely to work in this situation! Note, though, that audit coverage of estate tax returns is relatively high. According to Eller and Johnson (1999) , in 1992 19 percent of estate tax returns filed (not all of which were taxable) were audited. The audit rate rose with the size of the gross estate, with 11 percent of estates below $1 million being audited, rising to over 48 percent for estates over $5 million. Because of the concentration of audits on the largest estates, the audits covered returns with 63 percent of the reported tax liability.
Eller, Erard, and Ho (forthcoming) show that 60 percent of audited estates in 1992 resulted in an additional positive assessment, 20 percent resulted in no change in tax liability, and 20 percent resulted in a reduced tax bill. Extrapolating from the results of a sample of those estate tax returns that were audited, Erard (1998) estimated overall evasion to be 13 percent of the potential tax base, which is slightly lower than the estimated tax gap for the income tax.
Implications of Avoidance and Evasion
What are the implications of avoidance and evasion for the equity and efficiency of the estate tax? As to equity, certain opponents of the estate tax have asserted that the nature of the avoidance and evasion is such that it renders the tax burden regressive, at least within the highly wealthy category of those subject to the tax. For example, consider the following passage from JEC (1998, p. 31):
"One way to measure vertical equity is to compare the average tax rates for different income or asset levels. Based on this criterion, the estate tax does not exhibit vertical equity. According to IRS data, the average estate tax rate for the largest estates (gross estate over $20 million) is actually lower than the average tax rate for estates in the $2.5 million to $5 million range." (Italics in original)
It is true that for estate tax returns filed in 1997, the ratio of net estate tax to gross estate was lower for the over $20 million estate tax class (11.8 percent) than for the $2.5 to $5 million class (15.0 percent).
22 But this apparent anomaly in the face of graduated tax rates occurs for two reasons that are certainly not related to evasion or to any sophisticated tax planning schemes. First, charitable deductions are larger as a fraction of gross estate for the higher wealth group, 28.4 percent versus 5.7 percent (see Table 3 ). Second, the credit for gift taxes already paid and for state death taxes paid are larger for the higher estates, 5.6 percent versus 3.3 percent.
What are the implications of avoidance and evasion for efficiency? First, administrative costs and compliance costs are part of the resource cost of collecting the tax, to be added to the costs of distorting behavior referred to earlier. A more intriguing but more difficult question is to what extent the avoidance and evasion opportunities mitigate the disincentive effects the tax would otherwise cause. Opponents claim that the tax is both easy to avoid and a serious deterrent to wealth accumulation. At first glance, these arguments sound inconsistent: if it is so easy to avoid, why does the tax hurt wealth accumulation? As Slemrod (forthcoming) shows, however, these two claims need not be logically inconsistent. Whether they are depends on the nature of the avoidance technology. If greater wealth lowers the cost of a given dollar amount of avoidance, then the availability of avoidance does reduce the effective disincentive to accumulate wealth that the estate tax would otherwise cause. If, alternatively, the cost of a given dollar amount of reduction in the taxable estate is independent of wealth, then the disincentive is unaffected by the avoidance opportunities. To answer this question, one would need to examine the pricing structure of various estate planning devices, as Schmalbeck (forthcoming) begins. His discussion suggests that the avoidance technology often features a fixed fee for an avoidance device that reduces the effective tax rate on an unlimited amount of wealth that is passed through the device. This reduces the effective marginal tax rate on wealth accumulation above the level that makes the fixed cost of using this device worthwhile, and therefore reduces the effective progressivity of the estate tax system. Just as there is heterogeneity in bequest motives, there is certainly heterogeneity in the vigor with which people pursue tax avoidance opportunities. There are undoubtedly people who maximize the after-tax bequest, while at the same time there are many others who do not pursue even the most basic tax planning strategies. Poterba (1998) has documented that most wealthy people do not take advantage of the annual $10,000 per donor, per recipient exemption for inter vivos gifts. There are several plausible explanations for at least part of the lack of giving, including precautionary motives among donors. But the low level of giving may also be due to people finding it uncomfortable to contemplate their own demise. In this case, the limited response of inter vivos gifts may be an indication that the revenue leak, and therefore the efficiency costs, are not as large as they might otherwise be.
EFFECTS ON SAVING AND LABOR SUPPLY
Combined with the income tax, the marginal tax disincentive to work and save created by the estate tax for the affluent can be exceptionally high. The top federal income tax rate of 39.6 percent, combined with the top estate tax rate of 55 percent, implies a tax penalty per dollar earned with the intent to bequeath of up to 73 percent. Nevertheless, the impact of the tax on saving and labor supply is complex. Indeed, several prominent economists (including John Stuart Mill, A.C. Pigou, Richard Musgrave, and Joseph Pechman) have argued that taxes payable at death have smaller disincentive effects for lifetime saving and labor supply than do equal-revenue taxes imposed during life.
Saving
There are few formal models of estate taxes and saving. Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) estimate that a one dollar decline in gross transfers reduces the capital stock by about 70 cents, but they do not estimate how transfer taxes affect gross transfer levels. Caballe (1995) develops an altruistic model with endogenous growth, human capital, and bequests and finds that estate taxes reduce the capital stock. A feature of his model, however, is that estate taxes and capital income taxes have identical effects, which appears to be somewhat of a special case. Laitner (forthcoming) provides the most sophisticated model of estate taxes to date, embedding them in an overlapping generations simulation model. He finds that removing estate taxes would have a small positive effect on the long-term ratio of capital to labor.
Gale and Perozek (forthcoming) develop a theoretical model of a parent and child interacting under a variety of alternative transfer motives. They show that the qualitative effects of estate taxes on saving depend on why donors give bequests or accumulate wealth, on whether the effect on the donor is considered, and on how the government disposes of the revenue. In this framework, estate taxes can raise the combined saving by the donor and recipient under several different transfer motives.
Indirect evidence on the impact of estate taxes on saving from analyses of the effects of income taxes on saving is relevant and the bulk of the evidence suggests that the effect is small. Estate taxes are levied at higher rates, which might suggest a larger effect. But they are also levied at more distant points in the future, suggesting smaller effects. In any case, direct evidence of the effects of estate taxes is sparse.
Kopczuk and Slemrod (forthcoming), using estate tax return data from 1916 to 1996, explore links between changes in the estate tax rate structure and reported estates, which reflect the impact of the tax on both wealth accumulation and avoidance behavior. They find that an aggregate measure of reported estates is generally negatively associated with summary measures of the level of estate taxation, holding constant other influences. In pooled cross-sectional analyses that make use of individual decedent information, the relationship between the concurrent tax rate and the reported estate is, however, fragile and sensitive to the set of variables used to capture exogenous tax rate variation. However, the negative effect of taxes appears to be stronger for those who die at a more advanced age and with a will, both of which are consistent with the theory of how estate taxes affect altruistic individuals. Perhaps of most interest, the tax rate that prevailed at age 45, or ten years before death, is more clearly (negatively) associated with reported estates than the tax rate prevailing in the year of death. This suggests that future research should concentrate on developing lifetime measures of the effective tax rates.
All of the above discussion focuses on saving by the donor. Weil (1994) shows that the past or anticipated receipt of an inheritance raises a household's consumption by between 4 and 10 percent, after controlling for income, age, education, and other factors. Given the magnitude of typical household saving rates, Weil's results suggest that reduced inheritances due to estate taxes would substantially raise the donee's saving out of earned income. However, Holtz-Eakin, Rosen (1994a, 1994b) show that receipt of a large inheritance raises the likelihood that a household starts a business and raises the probability of the business surviving and expanding. Thus, to the extent that inheritances relieve liquidity constraints associated with investment, reduced inheritances due to estate taxes could reduce saving among recipients. However, only a small minority of inheritors inherit or start businesses.
Labor Supply
As discussed earlier, the estate tax is effectively a tax on one use of labor income, and so reduces the real wage. The numerous studies of how taxes affect labor supply, which generally find that the aggregate substitution effect is rather small, are therefore relevant. However, with one exception no one has attempted to directly measure the impact of estate taxes on the labor supply of potential donors. Holtz-Eakin (1999), using a survey of business owners in New York State, finds that those facing higher estate tax rates work less. This could be a reflection of the estate reducing labor supply, orin our view more likely-may simply reflect the fact that leisure is a normal good and households that face higher estate tax rates have higher wealth.
There has been more fruitful work on the impact of inheritances, and by implication the effect of any change in inheritances caused by the estate tax, on aspects of labor supply. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) show that receipt of an inheritance of $350,000 reduces labor force participation rates by 12 percentage points for singles and reduces the likelihood of married couples having two workers by 14 percentage points. Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993) and Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) find small reductions in the labor supply of inheritors who remain in the labor force.
CONCLUSION
The political process that brought us the modern estate tax in 1916, changed it numerous times since then, and is now flirting with abolishing it could hardly be described as delivering an optimal tax system, in the sense economists use the term-maximizing a well-defined objective function subject to revenue requirements and taxpayer responses. But the rigorous analysis that this framework provides is a major contribution of the economics of public finance of the last three decades. The framework clarifies the tradeoffs that are inherent in tax policy decisions, illuminates what value judgments-about which economics has no say-are involved, and identifies the crucial conceptual and empirical issues.
Alas, the political process is not going to wait for an academic consensus to arise, but that is not an excuse to avoid pursuing these issues. So we close with a plea for more rigorous investigation of this question 23 and a sketch of the role of estate taxes in such a system. The current U.S. estate and gift tax is the most progressive weapon in the arsenal of federal taxes. It is also levied on a base closely related to a family's wealth accumulation, arguably the most essential seed of economic growth. It is about life and death matters, and the tradeoff between equity and efficiency that infuses all of tax policy. But the estate tax is not the only progressive tax instrument-the graduated income tax has been around just as long as the estate tax, and now raises significantly times as much revenue. Nor is it the only possible transfer tax; many countries and U.S. states have inheritance taxes instead of estate taxes.
At least three issues are relevant for the optimal role and form of transfer taxes. First, the income tax is imperfect-e.g., much income in the form of capital gains is never taxed-and transfer taxes can function as a backup in delivering progressivity. Second, the public nature of the probate process reveals information about the lifetime well being of families that is useful in achieving the desired degree of progressivity in the least costly way. Third, transfer taxes could be imposed on estates or inheritances, which might have differing effects. These issues can be formalized in a model of optimal tax systems described in Slemrod (1990) and laid out in Mayshar (1991) , and must be quantified using empirical information on such things as the response of saving to estate tax levies. Although the political process regarding the estate tax is now moving quickly, a long-term challenge for the academic community is to clarify our understanding of the role of transfer taxes in the public finances of this country.
